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Articles 
A COURT OF ApPEALS OF MARYLAND TIME CAPSULE: SIX HISTORIC 
ARGUMENTS IN THE NATION'S OLDEST ApPELLATE COURT 
INTRODUCTION 
This article made its debut as a dramatic presentation 
at the Maryland State Bar Conference in Ocean City, 
Maryland on June 10, 1999. It presents a profile of six 
constitutionally significant cases argued before the Court 
of Appeals of Maryland. These cases, spanning a 150-
year period, combined great lawyers, great issues and 
historic resonance. 
State v. Buchanan was a sequel to McCullough v. 
Maryland and the 19th Century predecessor to the more 
recent savings and loan scandals. The case rewrote 
Maryland conspiracy law and featured an appearance by 
the U.S. Attorney General. It was also Luther Martin's 
last big prosecution. Baltimore v. State involved the 
State's takeover of the Baltimore City Police Department. 
It caused as much controversy as the State's takeover of 
the Baltimore City School Board in 1997. The early 
property rights case, Weyler v. Gibson, anticipates modem 
takings, and constitutional torts litigation. University v. 
Murray laid the groundwork for the later Supreme Court 
decision in Brown v. Board o/Education. The court's 
decision in Schowgurow v. State had a devastating impact 
on the criminal justice system. The decision ultimately 
resulted in hundreds of retrials and two Supreme Court 
decisions on double jeopardy. Finally, Stuart v. Board 
o/Supervisors, reminds us that it was not so long ago 
that a married woman was recognized legally only by the 
name of her husband. 
The arguments below were developed and drafted 
based on a number of historical resources including 
appellate briefs, the case as reported in the Maryland 
Reporter, and other historical and biographical infonnation 
provided by the Maryland Archives and the Administrative 
Office of the Courts. The authors of the arguments include 
the Honorable Glenn Harrell, Court of Appeals of 
Maryland, and attorneys Dwight Sullivan, Michael P. Smith, 
and Robert Zamoch. The dramatic presentation was 
performed by the Honorable Diana G. Motz, United States 
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, the Honorable 
Alan Wilner, Court of Appeals ofMaryland, the Honorable 
Glenn Harrell, Court of Appeals of Maryland, the 
Honorable Arrie Davis, Court of Special Appeals of 
Maryland, and attorneys Kevin Arthur, Michael P. Smith, 
Ralph Tyler, and Robert Zarnoch. 
•••••••••••••••••••••••• 
Narrator: The Court of Appeals of Maryland is 
probably the oldest appellate court in the United States. I 
Although created by the State Constitution of 1776, its 
origin goes back more than a half century before, when 
the Governor and his Council exercised an appellate 
jurisdiction roughly equivalent to that ofthe House of 
Lords.2 
Despite its ancient lineage, the court has not yet 
entered middle age. Its arteries are sound. It's gait is 
sprightly and its heart and pulse beat strongly as it marches 
toward the millennium. Today, we will look at a small 
cross-section ofthe court's history - six cases spanning 
150 years. We do not claim that these are the six greatest 
cases in the court's history. It might be impossible to 
assemble such a list. The greatest cases could still be 
waiting to be argued. But these six cases do have one 
thing in common; they resonate withhistory-Iegal history, 
Maryland history - the history of excellent lawyering in 
the State. And we hope you will agree that they ring with 
modem truths. 
•••••••••••••••••••••••• 
Journey back to the early part of the 19th Century 
- 1821 to be exact. The court is presently composed of 
six appointed judges who were also trial judges. 3 It has 
I See Proceedings of The Court of Appeals of Mary land, at the opening 
ofthe Court, statements of Judge Wilson K. Bames, Oct. 10, 1972,266 
Md. at xxiii [hereinafter Opening of the Court]. 
2See id. 
3 See Carroll T. Bond,Anlntroductory Description of the Court of Appeals 
of Maryland, 4 MD. L. REv. 333, 334 (1940) [hereinafter Description of 
the Court of Appeals]. 
30.1 U. BaIt. L.F. 13 
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been located in a room in the State House for some 40 
years, although the court also sits on the Eastern Shore.4 
We believe the judges wore robes, but they probablY did 
not have an elevated bench. The room looks very much 
like a trial courtroom. There was no limit on the length of 
oral argument. S It would not be until 1826, that the court 
would fix a six-hour limit on arguments on the Western 
Shore.6 Arguments by members - of what was probably 
a genuine appellate bar--could run for days and were 
marked by dramatic performance, flights of eloquence, 
learned allusions and, given their length, a great deal of 
tedium. 
•••••••••••••••••••••••• 
Our first argument combines two well-known 
components of Maryland legal history - banking scandals, 
like those experienced in the State in the 1960' s and 
1980' s, and Luther Martin - venerable Attorney General, 
distinguished delegate to the Constitutional Convention, 
''the bulldog offederalism," "Lawyer Brandy Bottle," and 
early-American super-lawyer. 7 
Toward the end of his long career, Martin, much 
like Ahab and the whale, became obsessed with the evils 
of the National Bank. He argued in the Supreme Court 
and lost McCulloch v. Maryland,8 which held that the 
State could not tax a branch of the United States Bank. 
Undeterred, in State v. Buchanan,9 Martin continued his 
assault. However, his was not a frivolous obsession. When 
Bank officers, James Buchanan, George Williams and 
James McCulloch wanted money from the bank, they 
simply took it without giving security or bothering to infonn 
4See id. 
5 See CARROLL T. BOND, THE COURT OF ApPEALS OF MARYLAND, A HISTORY 
the Bank's directors. 10 Martin sought to indict them-
charging a conspiracy to defraud and impoverish the 
Bank. I I While making the criminal presentments, Martin 
suffered a disabling stroke. 12 The case moved forward, 
but upon a demurrer of the defendants, two judges of the 
County Court of Harford County (over a dissent) 
dismissed the case, apparently concluding that the 
indictment charged no crime and that the State court had 
no jurisdiction. 13 The State appealed. 
Despite the confusion of the official reports, in the 
court of appeals the defendants were represented by Daniel 
Raymond and William Pickney.14 The State was 
represented primarily by Henry M. Murray and Robert 
Goodloe Harper. IS Also involved in the case was United 
States Attorney General William Wirt, who was specially 
admitted after taking the required oath declaring his "belief 
in the Christian religion." I 6 We will hear from Murray and 
Raymond. 
••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
THE STATE v. BUCHANAJV17 
Henry M. Murray for Appellant: The first count 
of the indictment charges the Defendants, Mr. Williams, 
Mr. Buchanan and Mr. McCulloh with an executed 
conspiracy-falsely, fraudulently, and unlawfully, by 
wrongful and indirect means, to cheat, defraud and 
impoverish the President, Directors and the Company of 
the Bank of the United States. 
These three men conspired together to obtain and 
embezzle a large amount of money and promissory notes 
III See Buchanan, 5 H. & J. at 319-322. 
II See id. at 323. 
81 (1928) [hereinafter A HISTORY]' 12 See Maryland and the Constitution, supra note 7, at 320. 
6 See id. at 137. 13 See Buchanan, 5 H. & J. at 324. 
7 William L. Reynolds II, Luther Martin, Maryland and the Constitution, 14 See id. at 328. 
47 MD. L. REV 291, 321 (1987) [hereinafter Maryland and the 
Constitution]. 15 See id. at 324. 
B 17 U.S. (44 Wheat) 316 (1819). 16 See id. 
9 5 H. & J. 317 (1821). 17 5 H. & 1. 317 (1821). 
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for the payment of money, commonly called bank notes, 
the entire swn having a value of Fifteen Hundred Thousand 
Dollars in United States currency. This money was the 
property of the President, Directors, and Company of the 
Bank of the United States. It came out of the office of 
discount and deposit of the Bank in the City of Baltimore, 
the very office where Buchanan was president and 
McCulloh was the cashier, without the knowledge or 
consent ofthe President, Directors, or Company of the 
Bank of the United States. 
The purpose of the conspiracy was to have and enjoy 
the money of the Bank for a long space of time - two 
months - without paying any interest or other sum and 
without securing the repaying of the money. In furtherance 
of this scheme, James W. McCulloh, the cashier of the 
office of discount and deposit, would falsely and 
fraudulently state and represent to the directors of the office 
of discount and deposit that the monies and promissory 
notes that were loaned had sufficient and ample security 
- the capital stock of the Bank. Williams, Buchanan and 
McCulloh carried out the scheme in abuse and violation 
of their duty and in violation of the trust reposited in them 
as officer of the Bank. 
It is not open to question that the matters charged in 
the indictment amount to an offense that could be 
prosecuted as crime. Conspiracy is a crime and an offense 
at common law. The gravamen of the offense consists of 
the unlawful combination or confederacy to injure a third 
person. The State does not have to show actual execution 
of that unlawful or wrongful purpose. This was clearly the 
law of England. But when our ancestors came to this land 
and they settled the colony of Maryland they brought the 
common law ofEngland with them as part of their birthright 
The law of conspiracy was part of that law and it remains 
in full force here today as it was in England then. So the 
act of criminal conspiracy should be recognized by the 
courts ofthis State as it has already been recognized by 
other states in the United States. 
Now the Defendants argue that Maryland courts 
cannot hear the case because the charges refer to the Bank 
ofthe United States. Nothing in Art. III section 2 of the 
Constitution requires the case to be filed in a United States 
court. The Ninth Amendment states that "[t]he 
enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not 
be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the 
Articles 
People." The Tenth Amendment states that "[ t]he powers 
not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, 
nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the 
States." So therefore, the State of Maryland has retained 
the power to have these charges heard in its courts. 
Daniel Raymond for Appellees: Your honors, 
the indictment below was properly dismissed. The statute 
33 Edward §1 is the origin of the Law of Conspiracy. 
This statute does not include conspiracies to cheat. 
Cheating itself, with one or two exceptions like 
cheating with false weights, false measures or false dice, is 
not an offense that is punishable at common law. It would 
therefore be an absurdity to punish an agreement to cheat, 
when cheating itself is not punishable by the State. 
Now the State has cited many, many cases either in 
argument or in submissions to you. Almost all of those 
cases are conspiracies to do acts which are themselves 
indictable. They have no application here. I am sure that 
in those many, many cases you might find a few of a 
different character, that are from doubtful authority, from 
which one might weave together a principle oflaw that is 
just absurd on its face - that you can be indicted for 
conspiracy to do something that in and of itself you cannot 
be indicted for. Those questionable cases do not justify a 
reversal here. 
The State also contends that our ancestors brought 
with them the common law of England, and that that law 
as it sees it must be taken as established at the time of 
their emigration. Even if that is so, the common law in 
England at the time was that a conspiracy is not a crime 
unless it is to do some act which is itselfindictable. 
In addition, the indictments were properly dismissed 
because even if a naked agreement to cheat is indictable 
in this State, it must still be an agreement to cheat some 
person or being known to the laws of the state of Maryland. 
The Bank of the United States was created by a 
government foreign to Maryland. The Bank was created 
under the laws of the United States. An agreement to 
cheat the Bank of the United States is no more an offense 
against the laws of Maryland, than an agreement to cheat 
the Bank of England would be. So if this Court decides 
that the matters charged in the indictments are offenses 
punishable as a crime, the courts of this State still have no 
jurisdiction over the case. Such a crime being perpetrated 
30.1 U. Bait. L.F. 15 
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against an entity created by the United States is only 
cognizable in the Courts of the United States under Article 
III, Sections 1 and 2 of the Constitution. 
••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
Narrator: In 1821, the court reversed the dismissal 
of the indictment. 18 Judge John Buchanan (no relation to 
the Bank officer), in a lengthy opinion, noted that Maryland 
had inherited the English common law on conspiracy and 
that the offenses were indictable even if nothing had been 
done in execution of the conspiracy}9 The court also held 
that the matters charged were not a crime against the United 
States, but a common law offense against the State of 
Maryland.20 Finally, Judge Buchanan said: 
It may be admitted, that the legislature of the 
state has no right to pass laws calculated to 
control or impede the operations of the bank. 
But it is difficult to imagine, how a general 
power in the judicial tribunals of the state, to 
punish an offence against the State, can be 
considered as an unconstitutional interference 
with the concerns of the Bank of the United 
States, or in any manner endangering its 
security, only because its officers happened to 
be the objects of the prosecution .... 21 
Despite the State's victory in the court of appeals, 
the scoundrels eventually prevailed.22 Buchanan and 
McCulloch were later tried in Harford County and 
acquitted by the same 2-1 vote that marked the initial 
decision?3 Subsequently, Williams was acquitted, because 
II See id. at 368. 
19 See id. at 352. 
211 See id. at 361. 
21 See id. at 362. 
n David S. Bogen, The Scandal of Smith and Buchanan, 9 MD. LAW 
by himself he no longer could be found guilty of a 
conspiracy.24 
Martin never recovered from his stroke.2s He moved 
to New York to be cared for by one of his former clients 
-AaronBurr.26 Martin died in 1826.27 
•••••••••••••••••••••••• 
In 1860 the court still occupied its traditional quarters 
in the State House, but a great deal had changed. As a 
result of the Reform Constitution ofl851 ,judges (who 
were now called "justices") were elected.28 To protest 
the change, the entire membership of the court declined to 
run for election.29 In addition, the court of appeals now 
consisted of only four judges.30 Bowing in 1828 to 
Jacksonian democracy, judges no longer wore distinctive 
dress,31 and the Constitution now required written 
opinions.32 
• •••••••••••••••••••••••• 
Bigger changes were taking place in the State. 
Recurrent election day violence in Baltimore City by 
members of the Know Nothing Party had won for the 
City the unenviable title of "Mobtown. "33 Roving gangs 
with blood-curdling names such as the "Rip Raps," the 
"Plug Uglies," and the "Blood Tubs" "cooped up" drunks 
and led them to cast multiple votes for their own party, 
while intimidating the opposition from voting with bullets, 
24 See id. 
2' See Maryland and the Constitution. supra note 7, at 320. 
26 See id. at 321. 
27 See id. 
21 See Description of the Court of Appeals, supra note 3 at 334. 
29 See generally A HISTORY, supra note 5 at 152. 
311 See Description of the Court of Appeals, supra note 3 at 334. 
31 See Opening of the Court, supra note I, at xxiv. 
FORUM 125, 131 (1985) (citing R. Harper, A Report of the Conspiracy 32 See Description of the Court of Appeals. supra note 3 at 340. 
Cases, 3 (1823». 
33 See THE BALTIMORE BOOK, NEW VIEWS OF LOCAL HISTORY 3 (Elizabeth 
23 See id. Fee, et aI., eds., Temple Univ. Press 1991). 
30.1 U. Bait L.F. 16 
brawn and mayhem - oftentimes with the assistance or 
sufferance of City Police officers.34 
In 1860 legislation came before the General 
Assembly to curtail such acts oflawlessness by creating a 
four-member Police Board of Baltimore City.35 Unable 
to kill the bill on the merits, the Know Nothings piled on 
obnoxious amendments such as one banning "Black 
Republicans" or "endorsers or supporters ofthe Helper 
Book, "an anti-slavery tract, from serving on the new 
Board.36 Nevertheless, the bill was enacted and was 
immediately challenged by the City, which contended that 
its charter was a constitutional one that could not be 
diminished by the transfer of control of the City Police; 
that only the Governor, not the General Assembly, could 
control appointments to the Board; and that the "Black 
Republican" disqualification was unconstitutional and not 
severable from the remainder of the Act.37 Following a 
loss in the Superior Court, the City appealed.38 Within 
weeks the case was before the court of appeals. Arguing 
for the City was Thomas Alexander.39 Among those 
arguing for affirmance was legal legend Reverdy 
Johnson.40 
••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
BALTIMORE CITYv. STATEH 
Thomas S. Alexander for Appellants: In the late 
session, the General Assembly of this State passed an Act 
for the purpose of repealing the powers of the Mayor and 
City Council of Baltimore to establish and regulate a police 
34 See H.H. Walker Lewis, The Baltimore Police Case of 1860,26 MD. L. 
REv. 215,218-19(1966). 
3' See art. 4, 1860 Md. Laws 312. 
36 See id. at 315. 
37 See Baltimore Cilyv. State, 15 Md. 376,407-424 (1860). 
38 See id at 380-401. 
39 See id at 407. 
4n See id at 411. 
41 15 Md. 376 (1860). 
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force, and in place of that power providing a permanent 
police for the City of Baltimore. The chartered rights of a 
large, prosperous city have been invaded by a legislative 
enactment which has no warrant in the Constitution. 
The Constitution does not confer upon the legislature 
the power to appoint members of the Police Board. 
Appointment to office is peculiarly an executive, not 
legislative, power. Section 11 of Article 2 of the 
Constitution gives the legislature, in creating an office, 
power only to proscribe the mode of appointment. This 
can, by no legitimate manner of construction, be interpreted 
to grant the power of legislative appointment. 
The Act transfers the whole existing police force of 
the City of Baltimore - officers and men - from the city 
governmentto the Commissioners. That is unconstitutional 
and illegal. The charter of 1796, in giving to Baltimore a 
local government, by unavoidable implication gave all the 
means necessary for the purpose of government, among 
which was a police power to maintain the peace and 
security ofthe governed. This is an inherent right, co-
existent with the government, and cannot be separated 
from it. If the legislature has no power to repeal the charter 
of 1796, it also has no power to dismember the 
government created by it, by annulling and destroying 
important and indispensable powers. 
It is further provided by section 6 of the Act, "that 
no Black Republican ... shall be appointed to any office 
under said Board." The prohibition of the Black Republican 
introduces into our legislation the broad principle of 
proscription for the sake of political opinion The invaluable 
birthright of every freeman is that he may express at 
pleasure his opinions on all subjects of public policy, 
restrained only by positive enactment to the contrary. 
If a legislature in former days had proscribed the 
Roman Catholic or the naturalized citizen, it is presumed 
this Court would have no difficulty in pronouncing against 
the constitutionality of the provision. In principle, the 
proscription is the same. In degree the difference is that 
whilst the test of religion or of birth is susceptible of 
evidence, the test created by the Police Bill rests in the 
pleasure of the Police Board. What is Black 
Republicanism? A Black Republican may be defined to 
be one who thinks the area of slavery ought not to be 
enlarged. Again, he may be defined to be one who thinks 
Congress has power to legislate over the subject of slavery 
30.1 U. Bait. L.F. 17 
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in the territories. It is certain that in the letter of the 
proscription there is an elasticity which will, with willing 
minds, justify its expansion over two-thirds of the 
population of Baltimore. If this disqualifying clause is an 
operative part of the Act, the whole Act must be 
pronounced unconstitutional. 
Reverdy Johnson for Appellees: The questions 
regarding the judgment of the court below fall under two 
heads: the first relating to the authority of the legislature to 
create a Board of Police and to appoint its members; and 
the second relating to the powers conferred on the Board. 
As to the ability of the General Assembly to create 
and fill an office, it is sufficient to refer to Article 2, Section 
11 of the Constitution which provides that the governor 
shall nominate and, by and with the advice and consent of 
the Senate appoint, all civil and military officers of the State 
whose appointment or election is not otherwise provided 
for "unless a different mode of appointment be 
prescribed by the law creating the office. " The power 
of appointment to office is not, under our form of 
government, a purely and inherently executive function. 
The City of Baltimore maintains that because the 
Constitution recognizes the city as part and parcel of the 
organized government of the State, its charter is therefore 
placed beyond the power of the legislature to modify or 
change it. Yet it will hardly be pretended that it is beyond 
the power of the legislature to enlarge the limits of the city, 
by bringing portions of the county within its borders, or to 
confer upon the city authorities the discharge of other duties 
than those they now possess. Such has never been the 
construction of the Constitution. The charter of the city, 
from the day of its passage to the present, has constantly 
been subject to alteration and amendment by the 
legislature, and the inconveniences which would result from 
now placing it beyond the power of such alteration and 
amendment are so obvious that they need not be pressed. 
Nothing but plain and explicit language in the Constitution 
could effect such a result. Such language cannot be found 
in that instrument. It is clear that the people when they 
adopted the Constitution never supposed they were parting 
with the power to govern and control the City of Baltimore, 
and to pass such laws as they might deem the public good 
required to meet the constantly changing and increasing 
necessities ofits population. 
30.1 U. Bait L.F. 18 
An objection is raised to the proviso that "no Black 
Republican, or endorser or supporter of the Helper Book, 
shall be appointed to any office under said Board." It is 
said that this proviso proscribes persons for the sake of 
their political opinions. But, if such proscription was 
designed, it is totally at variance with the other provision 
of the law which requires the Commissioners to take an 
oath that they will not appoint any person to, or remove 
any person from any office under "on account of his 
political opinion." It is a provision inteIjected into the Act 
repugnant to its whole scope and object, and if it imposes 
a disqualification for office not sanctioned by the 
Constitution, it will be stricken from the law without 
impairing the efficiency of the other parts of the law. 
••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
Narrator: As quickly as the case arrived in the court 
of appeals, it concluded. The justices had little trouble 
upholding the law, reasoning that the City was a creature 
of the State and that the Governor had no exclusive power 
to appoint that was infringed by the Police Reform Act. 42 
As to the "Black Republican" qualification for office, the 
Court's opinion stated that "we cannot understand, 
officially, who are meant to be affected by the provis[ion], 
and, therefore cannot express ajudicial opinion on the 
question. "43 Thus, this particular confrontation between 
City and State ended and order was restored on City 
election days. Of course, as a result of a series oflater 
General Assembly enactments, the City regained control 
over its police force.44 However to this day, the City Police 
is by law a "state" agency. 45 It would not be the last time 
that the General Assembly would transfer a major function 
from the City to the State. With varying degrees of City 
consent, in the 1990's the jail and the local board of 
education were made subject to State control. 
42 See id. at 459-61. 
43 See id. at 468. 
44 See Md. Ann Code art. 24, § 16-101 (1957, Rep\. Vol 1998). 
4S See id. 
••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
It is nearly 50 years later. The court survived the 
Civil War and two more Constitutional Conventions. But 
a great deal had changed. There was no longer a special 
appellate bar and lawyers no longer wore long black coats 
and high silk hats.46 More elaborate briefs were required. 
Arguments were shorter and no longer sprinkled with 
classical allusions.47 "Justices" became "judges" again. 
By 1914 the judges would return to black silken ,gowns 
as the ceremonial dress.48 Most importantly, in 1903, after 
122 years, the eight judges of the court moved out of the 
State House into a new courtroom on State Circle.49 One 
reason for the move, the need to house an expanding State 
law library, suggested the increasing complexity of the 20th 
century legal scene. 
•••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
Our next case appears to be a small one. The 
Plaintiffs recovered a one-cent judgment against the 
State.50 Naturally, the Government appealed. However, 
appearances are deceiving and the eventual influence of 
the decision is immense. Ironically, it involved a dispute 
over a portion of "Great Constitution" Street in Baltimore 
City.51 The roadbed was owned by the Gibsons and on 
this property the State, without their consent, built an 
extension of the Maryland Penitentiary. 52 The Gibsons 
sued John Weyler, the warden of the institution in 
ejectmerit.S3 Weyler, the user, not the taker of the property 
46 See A HISTORY, supra note 5, at 188-89. 
47 See id. at 188. 
4R See Opening of the Court, supra note I, at xxiv. 
49 See Opening of the Court, statements of Chief Judge Robert C. 
Murphy, supra note I, at xxii. 
leI See Weyler v. Gibson, 110 Md. 636,651,73 A. 261 (1909). 
51 See id. at 648, 73 A. at 261. 
52 See id. at 648-49,73 A. at 261. 
53 See id. at 650, 73 A. at 262. 
Articles 
raised the defense of sovereign immunity. 54 Judge Alfred 
Niles rejected the defense and ordered judgment for the 
Plaintiffs, including a nominal damage award. 55 On appeal, 
Weyler was represented by Attorney General Issac Lobe 
Strauss and the Gibsons by Frederick Fletcher.s6 
•••••••••••••••••••••••• 
WEYLER v. GIBSON7 
Attorney General Issac Lobe Strauss for 
Appellant: The State of Maryland may not be sued in 
this matter directly, nor indirectly through the warden of 
its penitentiary. The State, without its assent, cannot be 
impeded and ousted by its own courts from the possession 
and management of its institutions and property while 
discharging its public duties owed to the people composing 
our State. This is a firmly settled principle oflaw and 
public policy, supported by a legion of case authorities. 
I would note further to this honorable court that 
Warden Weyler, for the purposes of an action in ejectment, 
is not the true tenant in possession, nor is he a true party 
claiming adversely to the appellees' interests. The warden 
is but a mere servant at will of the directors of the 
penitentiary. The directors, were they a named defendant 
here, could assert the immunity of the State, as well as the 
equitable defense that the appellees should not be heard 
in ej ectment now when they stood by silently, resting on 
their rights, while the State expended public monies to 
erect the enlarged prison across Great Constitution Street. 
The warden, however, as a mere functionary, cannot 
personally assert such defenses. Appellees should not be 
permitted to maneuver this suit to choose an opponent 
whose choice of weapons with which to defend himself is 
so limited. 
Finally, as the public closure of Great Constitution 
Street has not been consummated in a complete legal sense 
by the Baltimore City authorities, appellees are not entitled 
to maintain an action in ejectment for land that legally 
54 See id. at 650-51, 73 A. at 261. 
55 See id. at 648, 73 A. at 261. 
56 See id. at 637,73 A. at 261. 
57 110 Md. 636, 73 A. 261 (1909). 
30.1 U. Bait. L.F. 19 
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remains impressed with a public easement as a street. If 
appellees have any right to sue, it is to sue the City and its 
commissioners for opening (and apparently closing) streets, 
for completion of the abandonment process and for a 
determination as to whether the value of their property 
interest is greater or lesser for having the street closed and 
whether the value of any public benefit accruing from 
closure would result in an assessment against appellees. 
Frederick H. Fletcher for Appellees: It cannot 
be, indeed it has not been, disputed that my clients, the 
heirs of the late Governor Carroll and his wife, are lawfully 
the owners of the fee of the roadbed of Great Constitution 
Street. Likewise, it is patent that the State, without my 
clients' permission and without compensation being paid 
to them, has taken upon itself to appropriate that land for 
use as part of the Maryland Penitentiary, thereby also 
denying to the public the former use of the land for its 
dedicated public easement as a road. Further, the State 
concedes, as it must, that its efforts to close Great 
Constitution Street legally were incomplete and imperfect. 
My clients have every right to maintain this suit in 
ejectment. It may be argued that we are arrogant to ask 
any court to order the State to move or remove a structure, 
built with considerable public tax revenues, that is fifty-
five feet tall with walls three feet thick. That, however, is 
notnecessarilyourobjective. We ask rather that the wrong 
committed against my clients be remedied as the court 
sees fit. 
Our Declaration of Rights declares that every man 
for any injury done to him in his person or his property 
ought to have remedy by the course of the law of the land, 
and that no man ought to be deprived of his property, but 
by the judgment of his peers, or by the law ofthe land, 
and section 40, Article 3 of the Constitution prohibits the 
passing of any law authorizing private property to be taken 
for public use, without just compensation as agreed 
between the parties, or awarded by a jury, being first paid 
or tendered to the party entitled to such compensation. 
Nor shall any State deprive any person of his property 
without due process of law. Speaking of the 14th 
Amendment of the Constitution, Judge Dillon says: 
"[i]t was of set purpose that its prohibitions were 
directed to any and every form and mode of 
30.1 U. BaIt L.F. 20 
State action - whether in the shape of 
constitutions, statutes, orjudicialjudgments-
that deprived any person, white or black, natural 
or corporate, of life, liberty, or property, or of 
the equal protection of the laws. Its value consists 
in the great fundamental principles of right and 
justice which it embodies and makes part of the 
organic law of the nation." 
If these rights are to have any meaning, the State cannot 
evade its obligations here. 
•••••••••••••••••••••••• 
Narrator: The court of appeals affirmed Judge 
Niles, resting its decision on constitutional grounds. 58 The 
judges said that: 
[I]t would be strange indeed, in the face of the 
solemn constitutional guarantees, which place 
private property among the fundamental and 
indestructible rights of the citizen, if [the] 
principle of [sovereign immunity] could be 
extended and applied so as to preclude him 
from prosecuting an action of ejectment against 
a State Official unjustly and wrongfully 
·thh ld· 59 WI 0 mg property .... 
The judges in essence told the State to settle the case or 
condemn the Gibson property. So presumably, they 
received a little more than a penny. 
Although rarely cited for 80 years, in the 1980' sand 
1990' s Weyler v. Gibson became the cornerstone of the 
court's unique constitutional torts jurisprudence. 60 As a 
result ofWeyler, State and local officials have no immunity 
from a state constitutional claim such as taking of property 
or deprivation of due process. It is hard to imagine a 
greater deterrent to arbitrary and unconstitutional State 
conduct. 
S8 See id. at 653-55, 73 A. at 263-64. 
S9 [d. at 654, 73 A. at 263. 
(.0 See also Clea v. City of Baltimore, 312 Md. 662, 541 A.2d 1303 
(I988)(reads Wyler v. Gibson as eliminating immunity for state 
constitutional torts). 
••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
A major event in the history of the Court of Appeals 
also happened to be a major event in the history of the 
civil rights movement and a major event in the life of 
Thurgood Marshall. It began in 1930 when Marshall was 
denied admission to the University of Maryland Law 
School solely because of his race.61 Instead of being 
allowed to attend a school in his home state that was a 
10-minute trolley ride from his home, for three years 
Marshall had a grueling commute to Howard University in 
Washington, D.C.62 At Howard, Marshall graduated first 
in his clasS.63 After he passed the Maryland bar, he entered 
private practice.64 Soon, however, his major occupation 
was helping to rebuild the Baltimore branch of the 
NAACp6s and planning litigation to open doors for African 
Americans, particularly at post-graduate institutions such 
as the University of Maryland Law School.66 
Marshall helped choose an ideal plaintiff to attack 
the segregationist policies of the law school- Donald 
Gaines Murray, a 20-year old Amherst graduate.67 Murray 
wrote once to the University and received back a form 
letter advising him of the school's separatist policies, but 
of the possibility of a scholarship at an out of state school. 68 
He applied once, then twice to Maryland, but was denied 
admission on both occasions.69 The last letter notified 
Murray of the "exceptional facilities open to you for the 
61 MICHAEL D. DAVIS & HUNTER R. CLARK, THURGOOD MARSHALL: WARRIOR 
AT THE BAR, REBEL ON THE BENCH 47 (1992) [hereinafter THURGOOD 
MARSHALL)' 
62 See id. at 47-48. 
63 See id. at 61. 
64 See id. at 69. 
6' See id. at 75. 
66 See id. at 77. 
67 See Appellee's Brief at 4, University v. Murray, 169 Md. 478,182 A. 
Articles 
study oflaw" at Howard University.70 Soon thereafter, 
Marshall filed a mandamus action against the University 
of Maryland, seeking Murray's admission.71 Using the 
"Separate but Equal" doctrine as a sword, Marshall 
charged that the University's policies denied equal 
protection because there was no state law school for 
African American students.72 Although there had never 
been a court-ordered desegregation of a public school, 
Marshall convinced Baltimore City Judge Eugene O'Dunne 
that the University's exclusionary policy was 
unconstitutional and that a mandamus should issue.73 An 
appeal followed to the court of appeals. Arguing for the 
State was Assistant Attorney General Charles Le Viness; 
for Murray, Thurgood Marshall. 74 
••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
UNIVERSITY v. MURRA.f1s 
Charles Le Viness for Appellant: While 
preserving Maryland's traditional policy of separation of 
the races, the State has met the demand of the negroes for 
higher education by establishing a system of scholarships 
to institutions out of the State for the exclusive use and 
benefit of colored students. This scholarship policy was 
launched by the Legislature of 1933, which provided that 
the Board of Regents of the University of Maryland might 
set apart a portion of the State appropriation for Princess 
Anne Academy and establish scholarships for negro 
students who might wish to take professional courses or 
other work not offered in Princess Anne but which were 
offered white students at the University of Maryland. 
To its negro citizens who desire to take up law work, 
Maryland says substantially this: "under our policy of 
separate schools for both races it is permissible and proper 
711 See id. at 6, Murray (No. 53). 
71 See University v. Murray, 169 Md. 478, 479, 182 A. 590 (1936). 
72 See Appellee's Brief at 7, Murray (No. 53). 
590 (1936) (No. 53). 73 See Murray, 169 Md. at 479, 182 A. at 590. 
68 See id. at 5-6, Murray (No. 53). 74 See id. at 479-80, 182 A. at 590. 
69 See id. at 4, Murray (No. 53). 7S 169 Md. 478, 182 A. 590 (1936). 
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for the University of Maryland Law School to deny your 
admittance. If you were admitted, you would have to pay 
the tuition fee of$203 a year. We cannot yet give you a 
separate law school in the State: there is no sufficient 
demand for it, nor sufficient money available to start it. 
However, to even things up, we will pay your tuition at 
some law school of your own selection out of the State. 
You will save the $203 tuition fee at Maryland and you 
may apply this money to your maintenance at the law school 
of your choice." 
The classification of students is a matter of internal 
State policy. Ifit were unconstitutional to classify on the 
basis of race, it also would be improper to classify on the 
basis of studies, or on the basis of sex. Certainly, it cannot 
be contended that if a state provided a law school for its 
citizens it also must provide a medical school, or an 
engineering school. The University of Maryland includes 
among its Baltimore schools a law school and a medical 
school. It does not include an engineering school. Yet, 
this is a discrimination in favor of those desiring to study 
law or medicine and against those desiring to study 
engineering. Similarly, a state might provide, without 
encountering constitutional objections, a certain school for 
men without a corresponding school for women. 
Distinctions on the basis of sex uniformly have been upheld 
by the courts. 
In the absence of statute compelling mixture of the 
races at professional levels, it is submitted that the Regents 
are entirely within their rights in cleaving fast to Maryland's 
traditional policy of separation. 
Thurgood Marshall for Appellee: What is at 
stake here is more than the rights of my client. It is the 
moral commitment stated in our country's creed. The State 
is under no compulsion to establish a state university. Yet 
if a state university is established, the rights of white and 
black are measured by the test of equality in privileges 
and opportunities. No arbitrary right to exclude qualified 
students from the University of Maryland is claimed by 
appellants except as to qualified Negroes, whom the 
administrative authority would reject on the sole ground 
of race or color. 
While the Board of Regents of the University of 
Maryland has large and discretionary powers in regard to 
the management and control of the University, it has no 
30.1 U. Bait L.F. 22 
power to make class distinctions or practice racial 
discrimination. The reason is obvious. A discrimination 
by the Board of Regents against Negroes today may well 
spread to a discrimination against Jews on the morrow; 
Catholics on the day following; red headed men the day 
after that. 
The dual and inferior standard which appellants apply 
to Negro education is evidenced by the pitiful attempt of 
the President of the University on the witness stand to 
assert that just as good a course was offered at Princess 
Anne as at College Park. May it please the Court, a 
college of technology for Negroes does not compare 
equably with a college of law for white students, whatever 
the cost. It is the essence of the idea of "equality" in this 
case that the facilities be the same. There is no school of 
law for Negroes in the State of Maryland. Further it does 
not sound well for the agents of the State to complain that 
there is no great demand on the part of Negroes for 
collegiate and professional education, when the State itself 
has made it difficult for Maryland Negroes to qualify for 
collegiate and professional education because of the 
inferior elementary schools which the State and counties 
maintain and the absence of adequate high school facilities 
for Negroes. 
The State's scholarship program is a specious gesture 
to delude the Negto population of Maryland and keep it 
quiet. The scholarship is but a tempting mess of pottage 
held out to induce my client to sell his citizenship rights to 
the same treatment which other citizens of Maryland 
receive, no more and no less. Equivalents must also be 
considered in terms of self-respect. Appellee is a citizen 
ready to pay the same rate of taxes as any other citizen, 
and to go as far as any other citizen in discharge of the 
duties of citizenship to state and nation. He does not want 
the scholarship or any other special treatment. 
We do not concede that it is constitutional for a State 
to export its obligations and to exile one set ofits citizens 
beyond its borders to obtain the same education which it 
is offering to citizens of different color at home. It is not 
without significance that all the "free scholarships" which 
the State provides for its white citizens are in Maryland 
colleges and universities. Only its Negro citizens are exiled. 
Finally, Mr. Murray is an individual. His years and 
days are numbered, and he cannot wait for his education 
until there is a mass demand to the satisfaction of the 
Regents. A citizen's constitutional rights receive protection 
on an individual basis. 
••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
Narrator: On January 15, 1936, Martin Luther 
King's seventh birthday, a unanimous court of appeals 
affmned, agreeing that Murray had to be admitted to the 
University of Maryland Law School. 76 The building of a 
second school was not deemed an available alternative 
remedy.77 Chief Judge Bond wrote that "[ c ]ompliance 
with the Constitution cannot be deferred at the will of the 
State. Whatever system it adopts for legal education now 
must furnish equality of treatment now.' '78 
We all know what happened to Marshall. In Brown 
v. Board of Education, 79 he successfully attacked as 
unconstitutional the separate but equal doctrine he relied 
on in Murray, as the Supreme Court opened the doors of 
segregated public schools throughout the country. Then, 
as Solicitor General and later as Justice of the Supreme 
Court, Marshall continued his lifelong dedication to the 
preservation of civil rights. One biographer of Marshall 
has said that he was actually hoping for a loss in Murray, 
so that the issue might be taken to the Supreme Court for 
a ruling of greater impact. 80 However, upon his retirement 
from the Court in 1991, Marshall admitted that his 1936 
victory was "sweet revenge. "81 
After losing to Marshall, Assistant Attorney Le Viness 
was quoted as saying that he hoped that Murray would 
"lead[] the class in law school. "82 Like his classmates, 
Louis Goldstein and Fred Malkus, Murray did not fInish 
first in his class. But he graduated, became a respected 
member of the bar, practiced in Baltimore, and continued 
76 See id. at 489, 182 A. at 594. 
71 See id. at 488, 182 A. at 594. 
7K See id. at 487-88, 182 A. at 594. 
79 349 U.S. 294 (1955). 
KO See THURGOOD MARSHALL, supra note 61, at 92. 
KI See id. at 90. 
K2 See id. at 87. 
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to devote his energies to NAACP civil rights work. His 
statue can be found in Lawyer's Mall in Annapolis, not far 
from that of Marshall ' s, on the very spot where the court 
of appeals building once stood. 
••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
It is 28 years later, and once again, much has changed 
both with respect to the court of appeals and the judicial 
system. A 1944 constitutional amendment reduced the 
size of the court to five judges, but more importantly 
confirmed the court's key executive and legislative roles 
in the administration of the state judicial system.83 By the 
1960's, the Supreme Court's criminal justice revolution 
foreshadowed the need for an intermediate appellate court 
to handle the suddenly heavy workload of criminal cases. 
However, Maryland was to create its own mini-criminal 
justice revolution stemming from a routine murder case 
tried in the Circuit Court for Cecil County in the late summer 
of1964. 
Lidge Schowgurow, a Buddhist who disavowed a 
belief in God, was accused of murdering his wife.84 He 
was indicted by a grand j ury and convicted by a petit jury 
required by Article 36 of the Maryland Declaration of 
Rights to believe in the existence of God. 85 Challenging 
his conviction of first degree murder as a violation of the 
First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution, Schowgurow appealed to the court of 
appeals.86 He was represented by J. Grahame Walker; 
the State, by Assistant Attorney General Roger D. 
Redden.87 
K) See ch. 772, 1943 Md. Laws 1368 (ratified Nov. 7, 1944). In 1960, a 
constitutional amendment increased the size of the court to its present 
level of seven judges. See ch. II, Md. Laws 21 (ratified Nov. 8, 1960). 
K4 See Schowgurow v. Maryland, 240 Md. 121,123,213 A.2d 475, 477 
(1965). 
Kl See id. 
K6 See id. at 123-24, 213 A.2d at 477-78. 
K7 See id. at 123, 213 A.2d at 477. 




J. Grahame Walker for Appellant: Mr. 
Schowgurow was raised in the Buddhist faith. In an 
affidavit duly filed, he stated that the Buddhist religion to 
which he adheres does not teach a belief in the existence 
of God or a Supreme Being. He challenged the 
compositions of the grand jury which indicted him and the 
petit jury which tried and convicted him because Article 
36 of the Declaration of Rights requires jurors to express 
a belief in God and that requirement deprives him of due 
process and equal protection ofthe law. 
Four years ago, in Torcaso v. Watkins, the Supreme 
Court told the State of Maryland that it's requirement that 
public officers believe in God invaded their freedom of 
religion. What is unconstitutional for an officer is no less 
offensive for jurors. 
The jurors in this case were sworn in accordance 
with the requirements of Article 36 and obliged to profess 
their belief in God. It is common knowledge that 
substantial minorities do not profess to believe in God and 
it is presumed that such persons exist among the citizens 
of Maryland and the residents of Cecil County. 
We do not need to know how many Buddhists live 
in Cecil County or whether they were deliberately excluded 
from the grand and petit juries. No proof of discrimination 
is needed where the State Constitution requires the 
exercise of discrimination. Article 36, by its very terms, 
sets apart and discriminates against a segment of citizens 
who do not believe in the existence of God. It clearly 
prohibits an accused, whether a believer or a non-believer, 
from being tried by a jury composed of persons who do 
not believe in God, as well as persons professing a belief 
in God. Its application can easily result in prejudice to an 
accused when his lack of belief is manifested to the jury 
by his failure to take the oath before testifying. 
The First Amendment proscribes the use of essentially 
religious means to serve governmental ends. The trial, 
conviction and punishment of an offender is solely a 
government function for the protection of society. Its 
SS 240 Md. 121,213 A.2d 475 (1965). 
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secular character is obvious, but is perhaps best illustrated 
by the imposition of a death sentence, which would be 
hard to justify under any known religion. If the doctrine of 
separation of church and state is to mean anything, this 
Court should find that Article 36 has violated Appellant's 
constitutional rights and his conviction must be set aside. 
Assistant Attorney General Roger D. Redden 
for Appellant: Due process oflaw is an oracular concept, 
which eludes expository definition. Even the prodigious 
intellect of Justice Frankfurter found the task staggering. 
But, however complex the problem of definition, one finds 
solace, and at least visceral comprehension, in resort to 
due process's equivalent and basic measure - fairness. 
The question before this court is one of fairness alone, 
and in that portion of the criminal process which is devoted 
to the selection of jurymen, fairness requires only that the 
jury be indiscriminately drawn from among those eligible 
in the community for jury service, untrammeled by any 
arbitrary and systematic exclusions. 
The Appellant, a Buddhist, asserts that his co-
religionists have beenapriori excluded from Cecil County 
jury service because (1) they do not believe in the existence 
of God and (2) nonbelievers are excluded from Cecil 
County jury service on account of Article 36 of the 
Maryland Declaration of Rights. 
Here is the center of dispute. Mr. Schowgurow has 
proved nothing beyond his own allegiance to the Buddhist 
faith. He has not even tried to prove anything else. There 
is nothing in the record to show that there has ever been a 
single adherent of Buddhism resident in Cecil County who, 
aside from the belief-in-God issue, was otherwise qualified 
to serve as a juror, let alone that any Buddhist was excluded 
from the call or, being called, was excluded from the panel 
for failure to affirm his belief in the existence in God. 
The only pertinent evidence of any kind is the 
uniform declaration of the oaths administered by the Clerk 
of the Circuit Court for Cecil County: "In the presence of 
Almighty God, you ... do solemnly promise and declare 
that .... " This declaration is no filter through which 
nonbelievers cannot pass. Appellant negotiated it himself 
without difficulty when he testified during his trial, a fact 
which exposes the desperate emptiness of his present 
claim, something conjured up from a series of unfounded 
assumptions. 
As to the Torcaso decision, it helps not hurts the 
State's position. First, to the extent that Maryland caselaw 
may be construed to opine that the discovery of a single 
nonbeliever on a panel voids that panel's action, it was 
overruled by Torcaso, which held that expression of a 
belief in the existence of God could not be imposed as a 
condition precedent to holding public office. 
Second, Mr. Justice Black's identification of 
Buddhism as an atheist religion in Torcaso does nothing 
but confirm what the encyclopedists tell us. It does not 
create any presumption as to the extent of Buddhist 
practice in Maryland. It does not plant nor evangelize 
Buddhism on the Eastern Shore. It does not oblige the 
State's Attorney for Cecil County to canvass the 
countryside for naysaying witnesses to prove what is a 
good deal closer to common knowledge than the tenets 
of Buddhism - that resident adherents to Buddhism are 
unknown to Cecil County. 
The Appellant has not met minimal standards of 
showing unfairness and his conviction should be affirmed. 
••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
Narrator: The Schowgurow case was reargued 
and the panel included specially assigned Circuit Court 
Judge Shirley Jones, the first woman to sit on the Court of 
Appeals (however briefly). The court, in October 1965, 
announced its anguished but almost inevitable decision that 
the belief in God requirement for grand and petit jurors 
was unconstitutional.89 Rejecting the State's and a dissent's 
contention that no prejudice had been shown, the majority 
held that an actual showing of discrimination was not 
necessary when the exclusion of nonbelievers was "not ' 
only authorized but demanded by the Maryland 
Constitution. "90 In a seeming victory for the State, the 
court held that its decision did not apply retroactively 
"except for convictions which have not become final. "91 
But later decisions made it clear that a defendant could 
not implicitly waive this issue ifhis or her conviction was 
89 See id. at 131,213 A.2d at 482. 
90 See id. 
91 See id. at 131-32, 213 A.2d at 482. 
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not final before Schowgurow. 92 According to the Attorney 
General, this meant that two or three thousand defendants 
had to be reindicted.93 
Not only did Schowgurow move the criminal justice 
system into overdrive, but when some defendants on retrial 
received a higher sentence, double jeopardy claims were 
pressed. These Maryland cases eventually reached the 
Supreme Court and convinced the Justices for the first 
time to apply the Double Jeopardy Clause ofthe Fifth 
Amendment to the states.94 As to Lidge Schowgurow, 
after his retrial resulted in a hung jury and a mistrial, he 
pled guilty in exchange for an 18-year sentence.95 
••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
Our last argument occurred some 28 years ago and, 
although the Court appeared to change very little since 
1965, the world had changed immeasurably. The typical 
woman was no longer a "June Cleaver." She had entered 
the workforce, the marketplace, and the practice oflaw. 
She was no longer imprisoned by stereotypes or quietly 
willing to accept discrimination. Mary Emily Stuart was 
such a woman. 
Married to Samuel Austell, Ms. Stuart continued 
after her marriage to use her birth name.96 But when she 
tried to register to vote with the local election board, she 
was told that under state law she had to register as Mrs. 
Austell. 97 Stuart promptly filed suit in the Circuit Court 
for Howard County, mising both statutory and constitutional 
claims to the apparent state bar to the use of her real 
name.98 Denied relief, she appealed to the court of appeals 
92 See e.g .• Schiller v. Lefkowitz, 242 Md. 461,219 A.2d 378 (1966) 
(holding that while the rule of Schowgurow applies to civil cases, it does 
not apply retroactively even to those cases not finalized prior to the 
date ofSchowgurow). 
93 See A Test For Retroactivity In Criminal Cases, 26 MD. L. REv. 272, 
273 (1966). 
94 See e.g., Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969). 
9S See State v. Schowgurow, No. 541 (Cir. Ct. Garrett Co. Aug 25, 1966). 
% See Stuart v. Board of Elections, 266 Md. 440, 295 A.2d 223 (1972). 
97 See id. at 442, 295A.2d at 224. 
93 See id. 
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and was joined by a number of Friends of the Court, 
including the ACLU represented by Ruth Bader Ginsburg.99 
Stuart was represented by Arold Ripperger; the State 
Election Board by E. Stephen Derby. 100 
••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
STUART v. BOARD OF SUPERVISORSlol 
Arold Ripperger for Appellant: Mary Emily 
Stuart testified below that her marriage to Samuel Austell 
was "based on the idea that we're both equal individuals 
and our names symbolize that." Indeed, she said she would 
not have gotten married ifit would have jeopardized her 
name. Her name is on charge accounts, her driver's license 
and social security registration. Everyone, she testified, 
knows her by the name Mary Stuart. 
Neither Maryland common law nor its election laws 
force her to deny the truth and register to vote in her 
husband's name. The common law rule is that a person 
may adopt any name he or she wishes in the absence of 
fraud or deceit. 
As it was at common law, so now is it the option of 
a married woman to choose the name that she desires to 
use. Nellie Marie Marshall retained the name of her first 
husband at the time of her second marriage. Amy 
Vanderbilt, who has been married four times, said, "I have 
always used my maiden name." Lynn Fontanne, of the 
fabled Lunt and Fontanne acting team, adopted a 
hyphenated name, Fontanne-Lunt, as her legal name. Lucy 
Stone looked upon the loss of a woman's name at marriage 
as a symbol of a loss of her individuality and consulted 
several eminent lawyers, including Salmon P. Chase, later 
Chief Justice of the United States, and was assured that 
there was no law requiring the wife to take her husband's 
name, only a custom. She remained Lucy Stone. 
I t is true that § 3 -18 of the Election Code requires 
clerks of court to notify election boards of the "present 
names" of women over the age of 18 after being advised 
99 See id. at 441,295 A.2d at 223. 
11K. See id. at 441, 295 A.2d at 223-24. 
1111266 Md. 440, 295 A.2d 223 (1972). 
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of a "change of name by marriage." However, that statute 
does not apply in this case. Mary Stuart did not change 
her name by marriage. There was no duty to advise the 
clerk, no duty on the part of the clerk to advise the election 
board, and no duty or authority of the election board to 
question the name under which Mary Stuart sought to 
register to vote. 
If Maryland's law required a false registration by 
Mary Stuart, it would be unconstitutional. As the Amicus 
ACLU has argued, sex like race and alienage is an 
immutable trait, a status into which class members are 
locked by the accident of birth. The requirement that a 
married woman assume her husband's name to register to 
vote is not reasonable, but places her in equal status with 
infants, lunatics and convicted felons. By whatever name 
the Board of Elections calls its practice - administrative 
convenience, necessary procedure, mandatory 
requirement, it is discrimination and discrimination based 
solely on sex. In its simplest terms, a married woman is 
denied the statutory right to contract with her husband or 
she is denied her constitutional right to vote. 
Assistant Attorney General E. Stephen Derby 
for Appellees: Today it is almost a universal rule in this 
country that upon marriage, as a matter oflaw, a wife's 
surname becomes that of her husband. While a wife may 
continue to use her maiden name for professional and other 
purposes, her name as a matter of public record is that of 
her husband. 
The provisions of § 3 -18 on their face are premised 
upon an assumption by the legislature that a woman's name 
does change when she marries, in accordance with the 
common law rule. Any other conclusion would deprive 
the provisions of meaning because the only information 
possessed by the clerk of court is the fact of the marriage. 
The administrative application of the statute to require every 
woman voter who has married to change her name on the 
registration books gives the section meaning. If a married 
woman could elect whether to adopt her married name 
for voting, then the purpose of the statute in furthering the 
State's interests in preventing voter fraud, in providing an 
accurate trail of identification, and in uniform record keeping 
would not be served. 
The State Elections Administrator testified that there 
are approximately 1,762,000 registered voters in 
Maryland. Assuming one half are female and the majority 
of them are or will be at some time married, it will be 
necessary to have a trail to identify persons and to prevent 
voter fraud. If a married woman could register under 
different names, the identification trail would be lost. As a 
practical matter, the election boards of the State are not in 
a position to make complicated factual determinations as 
to whether a married woman voter is not and has never 
been known by her married surname. Therefore, it is 
reasonable for the boards, to insist always upon use of the 
surname adopted by marriage unless a married woman 
has taken the relatively easy step of changing her name 
legally for all purposes by a court order. 
There is simply no constitutional issue in this case 
involving a denial of the right to vote because appellant 
has not been denied that right. It is completely within her 
power and discretion to register to vote. She is required 
to do so in her legal name, whether by common law or 
custom, but no burden is imposed upon her which 
impinges upon her right to vote. 
To the extent that the court may find that a 
discrimination does exist, it is one based on sex and 
marriage because of the automatic consequent that, absent 
a legal change of name, a woman's surname becomes that 
ofher husband uponrnarriage. Ifit exists, the discrimination 
is one caused by the uniform common law rule or custom, 
applicable to married women, and it is not one involving 
the elective franchise. The right involved is the right to 
assume any name a person wishes. However, the right to 
assume a name of one's choice does not have constitutional 
status. Rather it is based on common law. Furthermore, 
the Supreme Court has yet to hold that discriminations 
based on sex are inherently suspect. 
Whatever inconvenience the State rule may cause 
Appellant is slight when weighed against the interests of 
the State in uniform recordkeeping, in accurate 
identification of voters, and in preventing voter fraud . 
••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
Narrator: A month before state voters approved 
an Equal Rights Amendment, and on October 9, 1972, in 
his first opinion of his 24-year career on the court, Chief 
Judge Robert C. Murphy, concluded that Maryland 
common law permits a Maryland woman to retain her birth 
Articles 
name and to use it nonfraudulently after her marriage.102 
The majority, over one dissent, also found that state election 
laws did not forbid such use because Stuart did not undergo 
a "change in name by marriage. "103 
The very next day, the judges dedicated a new 
courthouse on Rowe Boulevard - the court's present 
10cation.104 At the same time, the court adopted distinctive 
new judicial garb - actually a return to the dress worn by 
members immediately after the Revolutioruuy War: scarlet 
rather than black robes and a stock with tabs. lOS More 
than location and robes would change, as within a few 
short years, the court would have its first woman and 
African-American members. Now more than 223 years 
old, the Court of Appeals of Maryland remains a 
progressive and respected institution, with much ofits 
glorious history remaining to unfold. 
Visit the Maryland Archives website at 
mdarchives.state.md.us for more infonnation on this article 
and the State of Maryland in general. 
1112 See id at 455, 295 A.2d at 231. 
1113 See id. at 443, 295 A.2d at 225. 
1114 See generally Opening of the Court, supra note I. 
illS See Opening ofthe Court, supra note I, at xxii. 
30.1 U. Bait. L.F. 27 
Articles 
The University of Baltimore Law Forum 
Articles Solicitation 
The University of Baltimore Law Forum is currently requesting articles for submission 
relating to issues of importance in Maryland and/or Federal law. 
Please contact or submit materials to: 
Articles Editor 
University of Baltimore Law Forum 
The John and Frances Angelos Law Center 
1420 North Charles Street 
Baltimore, Maryland 21201 
(410) 837-4493 
E-Mail: UBaltLF@hotmail.com 
30.1 U. BaIt L.F. 28 
